Approval-based multiwinner voting rules have recently received much attention in the Computational Social Choice literature. Such rules aggregate approval ballots and determine a winning committee of alternatives. To assess effectiveness, we propose to employ new noise models that are specifically tailored for approval votes and committees. These models take as input a ground truth committee and return random approval votes to be thought of as noisy estimates of the ground truth. A minimum robustness requirement for an approvalbased multiwinner voting rule is to return the ground truth when applied to profiles with sufficiently many noisy votes. Our results indicate that approval-based multiwinner voting is always robust to reasonable noise. We further refine this finding by presenting a hierarchy of rules in terms of how robust to noise they are.
Introduction
Voting has received much attention by the AI community recently, mostly due to its suitability for simple and effective decision making. One popular line of research, that originates from Arrow [1] , has aimed to characterize voting rules in terms of the social choice axioms they satisfy. Another approach views voting rules as estimators. It assumes that there is an objectively correct choice, a ground truth, and votes are noisy estimates of it. Then, the main criterion for evaluating a voting rule is whether it can determine the ground truth as outcome when applied to noisy votes.
A typical scenario in studies that follow the second approach employs a hypothetical noise model that uses the ground truth as input and produces random votes. Then, a voting rule is applied on profiles of such random votes and is considered effective if it acts as a maximum likelihood estimator [10, 24] or if it has low sample complexity [8] . As such evaluations are heavily dependent on the specifics of the noise model, relaxed effectiveness requirements, such as the accuracy in the limit, sought in broad classes of noise models [8] can be more informative. We restrict our attention to approval voting, where ballots are simply sets of alternatives that are approved by the voters [17] . Furthermore, we consider multiwinner voting rules [13] , which determine committees of alternatives as outcomes [14, 2] . And, in particular, we focus on approval-based counting choice rules (or, simply, ABC rules), which were defined recently by Lackner and Skowron [15] . A famous rule in this category is known as multiwinner approval voting (AV). Each alternative gets a point every time it appears in an approval vote and the outcome consists of a fixed number of alternatives with the highest scores.
We consider noise models that are particularly tailored for approval votes and committees. These models use a committee as ground truth and produce random sets of alternatives as votes. We construct broad classes of noise models that share a particular structure, parameterized by distance metrics defined over sets of alternatives. In this way, we adapt to approval-based multiwinner voting the approach of Caragiannis et al. [8] for voting rules over rankings. Figure 1 illustrates our evaluation framework. The noise model is depicted at the left. It takes as input the ground truth committee and its probability distribution over approval votes is consistent to a distance metric d. Repeated executions of the noise model produce a profile of random approval votes. The ABC rule (defined using a bivariate function f ; see Section 2) is then applied on this profile and returns a winning committee. Our requirement for the ABC rule is to be accurate in the limit, not only for a single noise model, but for all models that belong to a sufficiently broad class. The breadth of this class quantifies the robustness of the ABC rule to noise.
The details of our framework are presented in Section 2. Our results indicate that it indeed allows for a classification of ABC rules in terms of their robustness to noise. In particular, we identify (in Section 3) the modal committee rule (MC) as the ultimately robust ABC rule: MC is robust against all kinds of reasonable noise. AV follows in terms of robustness and seems to outperform other known ABC rules (see Section 4) . In contrast, the well-known approval Chamberlin-Courant (CC) rule is the least robust. On the other hand, all ABC rules are robust if we restrict noise sufficiently (see Section 5) . We conclude with a discussion on open problems in Section 6.
Further related work
Approval-based multiwinner voting rules have been studied in terms of their computational complexity [3, 22] , axiomatic properties [21, 15, 2] , as well as their applications [5] . In particular, axiomatic work has focused on two different principles that govern multiwinner rules: diversity and individual excellence. Lackner and Skowron [16] attempt a quantification of how close an approval-based multiwinner voting rule is to these two principles. We remark that the primary focus of the current paper is on individual excellence.
The robustness of approval voting has been previously evaluated against noise models, using either the MLE [20] or the sample complexity [6] approach. These papers assume a ranking of the alternatives as ground truth, generate approval votes that consist of the top alternatives in rankings produced according to the noise model of Mallows [18] , and assess how well approval voting recovers the ground truth ranking. We believe that our framework is fairer to approval votes, as recovering an underlying ranking when voters have very limited power to rank is very demanding. The robustness of multiwinner voting against noise has been studied by Procaccia et al. [19] .
Additional references related to specific ABC rules are given in the next section. We remark that the modal committee (MC) rule is similar in spirit to the modal ranking rule considered by Caragiannis et al. [7] .
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we denote by A the set of alternatives. We use m = |A| and denote the committee size by k. The term committee refers to a set of exactly k alternatives.
Approval-based multiwinner voting. An approval vote is simply a subset of the alternatives (of any size). An approval-based multiwinner voting rule takes as input a profile of approval votes and returns one or more winning committees.
We particularly consider voting rules that belong to the class of approval-based counting choice rules (or, simply, ABC rules), introduced by Lackner and Skowron [15] . Such a rule is defined by a bivariate function f , with f (x, y) indicating a non-negative score a committee gets from an approval vote containing y alternatives, x of which are common with the committee. f is non-decreasing in its first argument. Formally, f is defined on the set X m,k , which consists of all pairs (x, y) of possible values of |U ∩ S| and |S|, given that U is k-sized and S can be any subset of the m alternatives of A. I.e., X m,k is the set {(x, y) : y = 0, 1, ..., m, x = max{k + y − m, 0}, ..., y} .
The score of a committee is simply the total score it gets from all approval votes in a profile. Winning committees are those that have maximum score. We extensively use "the ABC rule f " to refer to the ABC rule that uses the bivariate function f . We denote the score that an ABC rule f assigns to the committee U given a profile Π = (S i ) i∈[n] of n votes by sc f (U, Π) = n i=1 f (|U ∩ S i |, |S|). With some abuse of notation, we use sc f (U, S i ) to refer to the score U gets from vote S i . Hence, sc f (U, Π) = n i=1 sc f (U, S i ). Well-known ABC rules include:
• Multiwinner approval voting (AV), which uses the function f AV (x, y) = x.
• Approval Chamberlin-Courant (CC), which uses the function f CC (x, y) = min{1, x}. The rule falls within a more general context considered by Chamberlin and Courant [9] .
• Proportional approval voting (PAV), which uses the function f PAV (x, y) = x i=1 1/i.
These rules belong to the class of rules that originate from the work of Thiele [23] . A Thiele rule uses a vector w 1 , w 2 , ..., w k of non-negative weights to define f (x, y) = x i=1 w j . Other known Thiele rules include the p-Geometric rule [22] and Sainte Laguë approval voting [16] .
A well-known non-Thiele rule is the satisfaction approval voting (SAV) rule that uses f SAV (x, y) = x/y for y > 0 and f (x, y) = 0 otherwise [4] . Let us also introduce the modal committee (MC) rule which returns the committee that has maximum number of appearances as approval votes in the profile. MC is also non-Thiele; it uses f (k, k) = 1 and f (x, y) = 0 otherwise.
Noise models. We employ noise models to generate approval votes, assuming that the ground truth is a committee. Denoting the ground truth by U ⊆ A, a noise model M produces random approval votes according to a particular distribution that defines the probability Pr M [S|U ] to generate the set S ⊆ A when the ground truth is U .
Let us give the following noise model M p as an example. M p uses a parameter p ∈ (1/2, 1]. Given a ground truth committee U , M p generates a random set S ⊆ A by selecting each alternative of U with probability p and each alternative in A \ U with probability 1 − p. Intuitively, the probability that a set will be generated depends on its "distance" from the ground truth: the higher this distance, the smaller this probability. To make this formal, we will need the set difference distance metric
. So, the probability Pr Mp [S|U ] is decreasing in d ∆ (U, S). We will consider general noise models M with Pr M [S|U ] depending on d(U, S), where d is a distance metric defined over subsets of A.
Besides the set difference metric used by M p , other well-known distance metrics 1 (see Deza and Deza [11] ) are:
• the maximum difference or Zelinka metric d Z , defined as d Z (X, Y ) = max{|X \Y |, |Y \X|}, and
• the normalized maximum difference or Bunke-Shearer metric d BS , defined as
Evaluating ABC rules against noise models. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of ABC rules when applied to random profiles generated by large classes of noise models. To this end, we use accuracy in the limit as a measure.
Definition 2 (accuracy in the limit). An ABC rule f is called accurate in the limit for a noise model M if there exists n 0 such that, for every profile of n ≥ n 0 approval votes produced by M with ground truth U , f returns U as the unique winning committee with certainty.
Then, ABC rules are evaluated in terms of robustness using the next definition.
Definition 3 (robustness). Let d be a distance metric over sets of alternatives. An ABC rule f is monotone robust against d (or d-monotone robust) if it is accurate in the limit for all d-monotonic noise models.
MC is a uniquely robust ABC rule
We begin our technical exposition by identifying the unique ABC rule that is monotone robust against all distance metrics. Our proofs, in the current and subsequent sections, make extensive use of the following lemma. The notation S ∼ M(U ) indicates that the random set S is drawn from the noise model M with ground truth U .
An ABC rule f is accurate in the limit for a noise model M if and only if
Proof. Let d be a natural distance, U a k-sized set of alternatives, and a, b ∈ A with a ∈ U and b ∈ U . We will show that |N t a|b | ≥ |N t b|a for t = 0, 1, ..., span(d, U ). For t = 0, this is clearly true
We are ready to present our first application of Lemma 2.
Theorem 3. MC is the only ABC rule that is monotone robust against any distance metric.
Proof. Let M be a noise model that is d-monotonic for some distance metric d. Let U, V ⊆ A be any two different k-sized sets of alternatives. By the definition of MC, we have
By Lemma 2, we obtain that MC is d-monotone robust.
We will now show that MC is the only ABC rule f that has this property. Let f be an ABC rule that is different than MC. This means that there exist integers x * and y * with (x * − 1, y * ), (x * , y * ) ∈ X m,k , (x * , y * ) = (k, k), and f (x * , y * ) > f (x * − 1, y * ). We will construct a distance metric d and a d-monotonic noise model for which f is not accurate in the limit.
Rename the alternatives of A as a 1 , a 2 , ..., a m and let U = {a 1 , a 2 , ..., a k }, V = {a 2 , ..., a k+1 }, and W = {a k−x * +2 , ..., a y * +k−x+1 }. Notice that, by the definition of X m,k , (x * − 1, y * ) ∈ X m,k implies that 1 + max{y * + k − m, 0} ≤ x * and, equivalently, y * + k − x * + 1 ≤ m; hence, the set W is well-defined. Clearly, x * ≥ 1; so sets V and W share at least one alternative.
We define a distance metric between subsets of A that has d(X, Y ) = 0 if X = Y , d(X, Y ) ∈ {1, 2}, otherwise, and in particular d(U, V ) = d(U, W ) = 1 and d(U, S) = 2 for every S different than U , V , or W .
We are ready to define the d-monotonic noise model M. For simplicity, we use
for every other set S ⊆ A different than U , V , or W . For δ > 0 (to be specified shortly), we set p 0 = 1/3, p 1 = 1/3 − δ, and p 2 = 2δ 2 m −3 . We now compute the quantity
Observe that the RHS of (1) is increasing in δ and approaches − 1 3 (f (x * , y * ) − f (x * − 1, y * )) < 0 as δ approaches 0. Hence, for a sufficiently small positive δ, we have
By Lemma 2, f is not accurate in the limit for M.
A characterization for AV
In this section, we identify the class of distance metrics against which AV is monotone robust. Before defining this class, let us fix some notation; this will be useful in several proofs.
For a distance metric d and a set of alternatives U , let span(d, U ) be the number of different non-zero values the quantity d(U, ·) can take. We denote these different distance values by δ 1 (d, U ), δ 2 (d, U ), ..., δ span(d,U ) (d, U ). We also use δ 0 (d, U ) = 0. For t = 0, 1, ..., span(d, U ) and alternatives a, b ∈ A, we denote by N t a|b (d, U ) the class of sets of alternatives S that contain alternative a but not alternative b and satisfy d(U, S) ≤ δ t (d, U ).
Definition 4 (majority-concentricity). A distance metric d is called majority-concentric 2 if for every k-sized set of alternatives U , it holds N t a|b (d, U ) ≥ N t b|a (d, U ) for every alternatives a ∈ U and b ∈ U and t = 0, 1, ..., span(d, U ).
We are ready to prove our characterization for AV. Proof. Let M be a d-monotonic noise model for a majority concentric distance metric d. Let U and V be two different sets with k alternatives each. By Lemma 2, in order to show that AV is accurate in the limit for M (and, consequently, d-monotone robust), it suffices to show that
We will need some additional notation. For t = 0, 1, ..., span(d, U ), we denote byN t (d, U )) the class of sets of alternatives S that satisfy d(U, S) = δ t (d, U ). For alternatives a, b ∈ A, we denoteN t a (d, U )) the subclass ofN t (d, U ) consisting of sets of alternatives that include a and byN t a|b (d, U ) the subclass ofN t a (d, U ) consisting of sets do not contain alternative b.
To simplify notation, we set s = span(d, U ). Also, we drop (d, U ) (e.g., we use N t a|b instead of N t a|b (d, U )) from notation since it is clear from context. We have 
Now, observe that the probability Pr M [S|U ] is the same for all sets S ∈N t . In the following, we use p t = Pr M [S|U ] for all S ∈N t , for t = 0, 1, ..., s. Hence, (2) becomes
Similarly, we have
and, by linearity of expectation, Again, we use p t = Pr M [S|U ] for every set of alternatives S ∈N t (d, U ), s = span(d, U ), and drop (d, U ) from notation. We define the model probabilities so that τ = p 0 > p 1 > ... > p t * = τ − and 2 = p t * +1 > ... > p s = . Notice that such a noise model exists for any arbitrarily small > 0. Since there are 2 m sets of alternatives and τ is the probability that M returns the ground truth ranking, it must be τ > 1/2 m . We now apply equality (4) . Observe that, since
Now, observe that for t = t * , it holds |N t a|b |−|N t b|a | ≤ 2 m (the total number of sets of alternatives) and p t − p t+1 ≤ . Also, |N t * a|b | − |N t * b|a | ≤ −1 and p t * − p t * +1 = τ − 3 . Setting specifically = 1 s8 m , we obtain that
which is negative for m ≥ 2 since s ≥ 1. The proof of the "only if" part of the theorem now follows by Lemma 2.
It is tempting to conjecture that AV and MC are the only ABC rules that are monotone robust against all majority concentric distance metrics. However, this is not true as the next example, which uses a different ABC rule, shows. 
Robustness of other ABC rules
Our results for other ABC rules (besides MC and AV) involve two classes of distance metrics. We define the first one here.
Definition 5 (natural distance metric). A distance metric d is called natural if for every three sets U , V , and S with |U | = |V | such that |U ∩ S| > |V ∩ S|, it holds that d(U, S) ≤ d(V, S).
The next observation follows easily by the definitions.
Claim 5. Any natural distance metric is majority-concentric.
Proof. Let d be a natural distance, U a k-sized set of alternatives, and a, b ∈ A with a ∈ U and b ∈ U . We will show that |N t a|b | ≥ |N t b|a for t = 0, 1, ..., span(d, U ). For t = 0, this is clearly true since N 0 a|b = {U } and N 0 b|a = ∅. For t ≥ 1, let V = U \ {a} ∪ {b} and µ be any (U, V )-bijection on sets of alternatives. Let S ∈ N t b|a (d, U ). By the definition of µ, µ(S) contains alternative a but not b. Also |U ∩ µ(S)| = |U ∩S|+1 and, due to naturality of d, d(U, µ(S) ≤ d(U, S). We conclude that µ(S) ∈ N t a|b (d, U ). Since µ is a bijection (the sets of N t b|a (d, U ) are mapped to distinct sets in N t a|b (d, U )), we get |N t a|b | ≥ |N t b|a (d, U )|, as desired.
The opposite is not true as the next example illustrates. It is easy to see that a (U, V )-bijection µ has the following properties. Proof. Let U and V be two different sets with k alternatives each. Let S + , S − , and S 0 be the classes of sets of alternatives S with |U ∩ S| > |V ∩ S|, |U ∩ S| < |V ∩ S|, and |U ∩ S| = |V ∩ S|, respectively. Using this notation, we have
We will now transform the third sum in the RHS of (5) to one running over the sets of S + like the first sum. Let µ be a (U, V )-bijection on sets of alternatives; by Claim 6, µ maps every set of S − to a set of S + and vice-versa. Hence, instead of enumerating sets of S − , we could enumerate sets of S + and apply the bijection µ on them. The third sum in the RHS of (5) then becomes
The second equality follows since, by Claim 6, sc f (U, µ(S)) = f (|U ∩ µ(S)|, |µ(S)|) = sc f (|V ∩ S|, |S|) = sc f (V, S) and, similarly, sc f (V, µ(S)) = sc f (U, S). Now observe that sc f (U, S) = sc f (V, S) when S ∈ S 0 . Hence, the second sum in the RHS of (5) is equal to 0. By combining (5) and (6), we get
Now observe that the RHS of (7) is always non-negative. This is due to the fact that S ∈ S + which implies that sc f (U, S) = f (|U ∩ S|, |S|) ≥ f (|V ∩ S|, |S|) = sc f (V, S) since f is non-decreasing in its first argument and d(U, S) ≤ d(U, µ(S)) (and, consequently, Pr M [S|U ] ≥ Pr M [µ(S)|U ]) since d is natural.
Clearly, the RHS of (7) is strictly positive if and only if there exists a set S ∈ S + that further satisfies d(U, S) < d(V, S) (and, consequently, Pr M [S|U ] > Pr M [µ(S)|U ]) and sc f (U, S) > sc f (V, S) (notice that sets that do not belong to S + cannot satisfy these conditions). The theorem then follows by Lemma 2.
We now present two applications of Lemma 7. The first one involves the natural distance metrics. Notice that most popular ABC rules from Section 2 satisfy the condition of Theorem 8. CC is an exception; Theorem 8 implies that CC is not monotone robust for some natural distance metric.
Our second application of Lemma 7 involves all non-trivial ABC rules and an important subclass of natural distances.
Definition 7 (similarity distance metric). A natural distance metric d is a similarity distance metric if for every three sets U , V , and S with |U | = |V | such that |U ∩ S| > |V ∩ S|, it holds that d(U, S) < d(V, S). Theorem 9. Any non-trivial ABC rule is monotone robust against any similarity distance metric.
Proof. We apply Lemma 7 assuming a non-trivial ABC rule f and a similarity distance metric d. Non-triviality of f implies that for every two different sets U and V with k alternatives each, there is a set S such that sc f (U, S) > sc f (V, S). This immediately yields |U ∩ S| > |V ∩ S|, which implies that d(U, S) < d(V, S) since d is a similarity distance.
